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THE EMERGENCY RELIEF
SALES TAX
The Emergency Relief Sales Tax,' passed by the
Legislature at the second Special Session called by the Governor to afford unemployment relief, has resulted in some
uncertainty as to its scope and application. Perhaps any
new.tax, no matter how clear and concise its terms, would
result in a flood of foolish questions from persons who would
be reluctant to believe what the terms clearly stated. But
among the thousands of questions which have been received by the Department of Revenue, many raise problems
of extreme difficulty. The duty to assume the initiative in
solving these problems is not an enviable one. However,
in fairness to taxpayers, the Department of Revenue has
made every effort to answer all inquiries and make known
what position it will take in administering the law, so that
the payment of the tax may be adjusted between buyer
and seller when the transaction takes place, in advance of
the due date. This is a dangerous practice. Good intentions may prove a boomerang. Experience is the most reliable teacher in the administration of any new tax law.
Experience and further study may compel a change in
2
present rulings.
The purpose of this article is to discuss some of the
features of the tax and a few of the more important problems arising under it, indicating conclusions reached by the
Department of Revenue.
Though one may ask what possible bearing it has on
the meaning of words, it should not be overlooked that this
is a temporary tax, in effect for only six months; that its
I[Ex. Sess.] Act of August 19, 1932, P. L. 92, No. 53.
2 his word is used here and elsewhere in this article for lack of a
better word. Strictly speaking, the Department of Revenue makes no
rulings on legal questions save on the basis of an opinion by the Department of justice.
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purpose is to raise funds for unemployment relief; and that
the revenues which the tax is expected to produce have
already been appropriated and will already have been spent
for relief by the time the tax becomes due. The significance of these things is impossible to analyze. It may be
psychological. But consciously or unconsciously, the mind
of the tax administrator does and should take these things
into account.
In kind and constitutional limitations, the tax presents
no novelty in Pennsylvania. In these respects it is similar
to the Mercantile License Tax, on dealers which, in one
form or another, has been in force in Pennsylvania since
1821.' The Mercantile Tax has been called a tax on sales
or the business of selling." But here the similarity ceases.
Much misunderstanding results from confusing the
Sales Tax with the Mercantile Tax. 6 The Mercantile Tax
Act defines wholesale and retail sales and imposes a tax on
both, though at different rates. The act itself by definition
limits wholesale transactions to sales to dealers. All other
sales are defined as retail.7 This statutory line of demarcation has caused some confusion and dissatisfaction in the
Mercantile Tax, as it does not correspond, in every instance, with the understanding and terminology of business
men. The Sales Tax is limited to consumers' sales only.
In the sections of the Sales Tax defining terms and imposing the tax, the word "retail" does not appear." The sole
test, under the Sales Tax, is whether the sale is to a consAct of May 2, 1899, P. L .184, as amended.
4Act of April 2, 1821, P. L. 244; 7 Sm. L. 471.
5Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. 614, 46 A. 861 (1900); Crew Levick
Company v. Pennsylvania, 38 S. Ct. 126, 245 U. S. 292, 62 L. Ed. 295
(1917).
ePittsburgh Press, October 30, 1932, article entitled "State Tax on
Sales is Amazing Puzzle; Few Able to Agree on Who Must Pay."
This article cites a current mercantile license tax decision as a sales tax
case.
7Act of May 2, 1899, P. L. 184, Section 2.
sThe word "retail" does appear in Section 21. This section was
inserted by the Ways and Means Committee of the House after the bill

was introduced.
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sumer or to any person for any purpose other than for
resale, regardless of the amount charged, margin of profit,
or quantity of goods involved. Thus, while it is true that
the ordinary retail dealer must pay the Sales Tax, the tax
is by no means limited to the ordinary retail sale.
Soon after the act was passed, a question of vital importance arose; namely, is a buyer necessarily a consumer
if he proposes to sell what he buys, made over or manufactured into some different form or condition? In other
words, in order to "resell" must the goods purchased be
sold again in the same form or condition they were in when
purchased? A moment's reflection will show the significance of the question. In terms of dollars, the difference in
revenue would be expressed in millions. As applied to resales of goods in the same form or condition as purchased,
the act is clear. It does not apply to a sale for resale. It
is a single turnover tax. But as applied to sales of raw
materials, for instance, which are made over or manufactured into some distinctly different commodity and then offered for sale, the answer is not so clear. It was known
that the Legislature assumed that the tax would not apply

to such sales. Before the bill passed the Senate, that body
first assured itself that the act would be so interpreted by
the Revenue Department.9 But once enacted, it became a
9In a letter dated August 18, 1932, when the bill was before the
Senate, Senator Sordoni wrote to the then Secretary of Revenue as
follows: "Dear Dr. King:
Will you be good enough to let me know what would be the ruling
of your Department in connection with House Bill No. 264. which comes
before the Senate for action.
For instance the Carnegie Steel Company sells bars to the McKeesport Tin Plating Company, they in turn selling tin plate or block
sheets to the Wilkes-Barre Construction Company, the Wilkes-Barre
Company in turn selling the completed can to the X Y Z Oil Company.
The X'Y Z Oil Company filling the can with oil and selling it to the
blank store who in turn sells it to the consumer. Would there be a tax
on each of the companies mentioned or would the tax only apply when
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question whether the Legislature had succeeded in expressing its intent. The doubt grew out of the case of
Commonwealth v. Sun Oil Company"o which arose under the
Liquid Fuels Tax Act of 1923 imposing a tax on "liquid
fuels sold in this Commonwealth for any purpose whatsoever, except for the purpose of resale."" The Sun Oil
Company sold liquid fuels to a manufacturer of asphalt.
The liquid fuels were mixed with other ingredients and
actually became a part of the manufactured product which,
of course, was sold. The Sun Oil Company contended that
the sale of the liquid fuels to it was not subject to tax because the liquid fuels were resold. The Supreme Court
denied this contention in the following terms, at p. 543:
."* * * The use of the gasoline purchased by the
Good Roads Company for mixing with other ingredients to make a separate and distinct article of commerce
does not constitute a resale within the meaning of the
act so as to exempt the purchaser from liability. The
object of the exemption was apparently to prevent
double taxation and impose the tax on the consumer
only. This is shown by section 8 of the act, which
provides that 'the tax imposed by this act shall be paid
by the person, firm, copartnership, association or
the can is at last sold to the consumer, namely, the man who buys the
can and oil?
Thanking you for a prompt reply, I am
Yours very truly,"
The reply, dated the same day, was as follows:
"My dear Senator Sordoni:
With reference to your letter of August 18th I beg to say that in
the opinion of the Department of Revenue the tax to which you refer
would be paid when the can is at last sold to the consumer and will be
paid by the vendor who sells to the consumer.
The act specifically exempts from the tax all sales to those who sell
again.
Sincerely yours."
These letters were read into the minutes of the Senate before the
bill was passed.
10290 Pa. 539, 139 A. 156 (1927).
11
Act of June 15, 1923, P. L. 834, as amended.
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corporation purchasing liquid fuels for his or its own
use, and not for the purpose of resale'. When used
commercially in the manufacture of other products
there is no resale of the 'liquid fuel' within the meaning
of the act. In such case it has changed its form and
identity and has become merely one of the ingredients
which go to make up an entirely distinct commercial
commodity. The manufacturer of such commodity has
used or consumed it and is, therefore, liable for the
tax

*

*

"

Confining the inquiry to the mere words used compels
the conclusion that here is a recent decision squarely in
point. But the inquiry cannot be confined to words alone.
When a tax is limited to sales of any specific commodity,
such as liquid fuels, it follows naturally and logically that
liquid fuels are not being resold when they constitute
merely an ingredient part of some entirely different commodity. No one would claim that the Liquid Fuels Tax of
1923 applied to the sale of asphalt merely because asphalt
is made in part of liquid fuels. Asphalt is not liquid fuels,
nor is it "ordinarily, practically, and commercially usable in
internal combustion engines.-1 2 The tax applied to such
liquid fuels usable, even though not actually used, in internal
combustion engines. The court was, therefore, confronted
with the practical problem of deciding whether liquid fuels,
admittedly "usable", finding their way into other commodities, were to be subjected to the tax once or were to
escape the tax altogether,
An entirely different situation arises under a tax which
applies to tangible personal property in general as contrasted with specific commodities. In such a case, can it be
said with equal force that goods are not purchased for resale by a buyer who mixes, manufactures, or applies some
process to the goods and sells them in a different form or
condition? Although one selling asphalt composed in part
of liquid fuels is not reselling liquid fuels, does it necessarily
follow that in such a case liquid fuels are not being resold
as tangible personal property? The practical problem is
entirely different than that found in the Sun Oil case.
121d. Section 1 (a).
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Here, the practical question is whether the same goods are
to be subjected to the same tax two, three, or more times,
every time their condition or character is changed, or
whether they are to be taxed but once. The Sun Oil case
can be cited for the proposition that the purpose of the resale
provision is to prevent double taxation.1 3
The only other Pennsylvania tax which applies to sales
of personal property in general is the Mercantile Tax,
which applies to sales of goods, wares and merchandise by
wholesale and retail dealers. If any authority is to be
drawn from the cases on the point in question, it should be
found in decisions under the mercantile law. Since the
Mercantile Tax imposes a lower rate of tax on wholesale
sales than on retail sales," the question frequently arises in
which class a given transaction falls. As previously stated,
the Mercantile Tax Act itself defines wholesale sales as
those made to dealers, while all others are defined as retail.
Furthermore, since the early case of Norris Bros. v. Commonwealth,15 a mercantile dealer or vendor has been uniformly judicially defined as "one who buys to sell again."
Therefore, save for the fact that this latter is a case law
definition instead of a statutory definition, the mercantile
tax affords a very close analogy to the question being discussed under the Sales Tax.
The following Mercantile Tax cases are enlightening

on this point. In Pittsburgh Brewers' & Bottlers' Supply
Company's Mercantile Tax,'1 the Commonwealth claimed
that the retail rate applied to sales by a brewers' supply
company of malt, hops, isinglass, bottles, and corks to
brewers, bottlers, and wholesale liquor dealers. The
Superior Court held that the wholesale rate applied to such
sales including the sales of malt and hops to brewers. The
13Supra note 10 at p. 543. Referring to the resale provision, the
court states:
"The object of the exemption was apparently to prevent double
taxation * * * ."

14Act of May 2, 1899, P. L. 184, Section 1, as amended.
1527 Pa. 494 (1856).
1638 Pa. Super. Ct. 121 (1909).
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court quotes with approval the time honored definition of a
dealer, but states at p. 127, et seq.,
"The cases fall very far short of establishing the
general proposition that vendors of or dealers in goods.
wares and merchandise must necessarily mean those
and those only who carry on the business of selling
things previously purchased, in the same form and condition, and not in the form or condition to which they
have changed after passing through some process. * * *
It is reasonable to suppose that if the legislature had
intended in the first clause of the section to include such
sales only as are made to persons carrying on the business of buying and selling goods in an unchanged form
or condition, they would not have left that qualification to uncertain inference but would have expressed it
in unequivocal terms."
Again, in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Bay
State Milling Company,17 the Commonwealth sought to impose the retail mercantile rate to sales of flour to a baker.
In denying this claim and holding that the wholesale rate
applies, the Allegheny County Court, per Snee, J., states,
" * * * the mere fact that the resale is made in another form

does not necessarily make such dealer the consumer."
The Revenue Department is persuaded that these cases
set forth the true principle governing a sales tax applying
to all tangible personal property sold for purposes other
than resale. The Sun Oil case is believed to be not in point,
as it concerns a tax limited to sales of particular property.
This is the basis of the Department's rule that the Sales Tax
does not apply to sales of goods which, as ingredients or
constituents, go into and form a part of tangible personal
property sold by the buyer. It seems unlikely that any
litigant will contest the Department's ruling concerning ingredients or constituents, such as raw materials. In any
case, the department charged with its enforcement will administer the tax atcording to its present view, until a higher
authority requires a different construction.
"Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, decided October

6,1932.
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Some have urged what might be called the economic
theory that the rule should be extended to include all items
which enter directly into the manufacturing cost, regardless
of whether such item actually becomes an ingredient part of
the thing manufactured. In the economic sense, perhaps
there is no difference between ammonia used and consumed
in manufacturing ice cream, and sugar, cream, flavoring, et
cetera, which actually become constituent parts of the ice
cream. But where would the line be drawn? Would the
rule, so extended, include machinery, oil used to lubricate
the machinery, and tools? It seems impossible to so extend
the rule without doing violence to the language used. This
question was avoided in the Pittsburgh Brewers' 6 Bottlers'
8

case.1

The question, "who is a consumer" arises in other
ways. What is the consequence, for instance, when a buyer disposes of tangible personal property in some manner
other than by sale? In other words, if a buyer disposes of
such goods in some manner other than by sale, as defined
by the act, must such buyer be considered the consumer,
and sales to him taxable? Sale is defined as "Any transfer, exchange or barter, in any manner or by any means whatsoever,
for a consideration." 9 Resale, in the expression "for any
purpose other than for resale "' 0 appearing in the definition
of vendor, must be used in the same sense. It seems, therefore, that a buyer who disposes of goods other than by sale
must be considered the consumer. Otherwise, such goods
would escape the tax altogether. The problem is then
reduced to the question of what is a sale under this quoted
definition, and here it becomes necessary to determine
where a line is to be drawn between transactions which
involve purely a transfer of title or property in goods from
IsSupra, note 16, at p. 128 the court states:

"The question whether sales of goods to vendors or dealers which
do not enter into the product sold by the latter or the package in which
sold, is not involved in the question presented for our decision, and
need not be discussed."
l9Supra, note 1, Section 2.
20Ibid.
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seller to buyer, for a consideration, and transactions which
are contracts for services or labor. Such service or labor
contracts may be divided into two general classes. One
class involves the application of labor or skill in the
production of some item of tangible personal property which
was not in existence at the time the contract was made.
The other class involves the performance of labor or skill,
not in the production of, but in connection with the article
after it is finished. It is this latter class which has proved
most troublesome, and this class of labor contract will be
described first.
If the quoted definition of sale is not broader than the
Uniform Sales Act definition21 some precedent can be
found. If broader, the question arises whether the definition includes every transaction which involves a transfer of
goods from one to another? This latter construction would
lead to surprising if not absurd results. For instance,
when a bootblack shines shoes, the transaction involves a
transfer of goods or tangible personal property from the
bootblack to his customer. Still, no one would maintain
that the bootblack is engaged in the sale of goods. He sells
a service. On the other hand, when a radio dealer sells a
radio, it is none the less a sale merely because he agrees to
install or attach the radio. If the consequences may be
weighed in arriving at a correct interpretation, then these
illustrations, to which hundreds could be added, certainly
urge the advisability of following what precedent may be
found under the Uniform Sales Act, by considering sale to
mean the same under both statutes. The association, in
the definition, of the term "sale" with the terms "exchange
or barter" lends additional support to this view.
Persuaded by these various considerations, the Revenue Department has concluded that so far as construction
or labor-service contracts are concerned, it will follow Uniform Sales Act precedent wherever such precedent can be
found. This course will reduce, but by no means eliminate,
21"A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller transfers the
property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price."

Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 453, Section 1.

110
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difficulty. For instance, in Farr v. Zeno,.22 a Uniform Sales
Act implied warranty was recognized in a contract to furnish and install a carbide generator. Apparently, no contention was made that the Sales Act did not apply. On

the other hand, in York Heating and Ventilating Company
v. Flannery,2" in passing on the sufficiency of the affidavit
of defense, the court held that there was no implied warranty of fitness in a contract for the furnishing and erection of a heating system, on the ground that the contract
in suit was a construction contract and not a contract for
the sale of goods. At page 23 et seq. the court states:
"We are of opinion that the Sales Act has no application to the contract in suit. That statute is an
act relating to sales-since amended to include choses
in action (Act of April 27, 1925, P. L. 310). It defines
a sale of goods as an agreement whereby the seller
transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price, and a contract to sell goods
as a contract whereby the seller agrees to transfer the
property in goods to the buyer for a consideration
called the price. The contract in suit was in no sense
a contract of sale. It was a construction contract.
The transfer of property in the fan, motor, pipe coil
heater, air washer, reheater coils, condensation system,
duct system and steam piping was but incidental to the
main purpose which was the furnishing of labor and
the assembly of material in the erection and construction
of a heating system. It would be just as proper to call
a contract for the construction of a building a sale of
the stone, brick, cement, wood, etc., which entered into
the erection of the building. This plaintiff took
specified materials and apparatus, manufactured and
supplied by various dealers, and by assembling them
and connecting them into a system designed by its
engineers constructed a new and different unit, a completed heating system. The operation was one of
building, or construction, not of sale, within the meanof the Sales Act aforesaid. Where a dealer sells a
machine or similar apparatus and the setting up or installation is but incidental to the sale, as in Farr v.
Zeno, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 509, the Sales Act applies;
2?81 Pa. Super. Ct. 509 (1923).
2387 Pa. Super. Ct. 19 (1926).
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but where as here the contract is really a building or
construction agreement and the furnishing of material
and apparatus is merely an incident thereto, the Sales
Act has no application."
Such distinctions are bound to lead to honest misunderstanding and difficulties in administration. Sales to
building contractors, plumbers, carpenters, painters, tinsmiths, roofers, repairmen, and like artisans, involve this
question. It frequently happens that such buyers will
sometimes sell "off the floor" or "over the counter", and
sometimes merely use or supply such materials in connection with the performance of a construction or job contract.
In such cases, or in any case where doubt is entertained
as to whether the goods purchased are to be disposed of by
sale, the Department has suggested that the seller either
pay the tax (whether he passes it on or not) or procure
from the buyer a certificate stating that the goods are being
purchased for resale as tangible personal property. If such
a certificate is given, the Department proposes to look to the
buyer for the tax, assuming, of course, that the goods are
sold or otherwise disposed of before the expiration of the
tax on February 28, 1933.
The other type of so-called labor contract, where skill
or labor is applied in the production of some item of tangible
personal property agreed to be sold, which was probably
not in existence at the time of the agreement, may be dismissed with comparative finality. Under the definition of
gross income, the act provides that there shall be no deduction on account of the cost of labor, service, or materials
used. 24 This is meaningless unless the tax applies to sales
or transfers of goods which are not in existence at the time
the contract to sell is entered into, and which the seller
agrees to produce or manufacture for the buyer. This conforms to the Uniform Sales Act, which defines such goods
as "future goods," and contracts respecting them as contracts to sell goods. 25 It should be observed, however, that
24Supra, note 1, Secton 2.
2SAct of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543, Section 5. It makes no difference
that the goods are to be made specially for the buyer. While executory,
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the tax does not apply until there is a sale. It does not
2
apply to contracts to sell, as such.
The manner of disposing of the goods becomes important also in the case of public service companies in connection with the sale or distribution of water, gas and electricity. There are two avenues of approach to this question.
One is whether gas, water and electricity are tangible personal property. The other is whether such companies are
engaged in selling within the meaning of the act. In an
opinion dated November 19, 1932, the Attorney General
ruled that the tax did not apply. Although the opinion is
so brief that it affords little to challenge, it is doubtless
sound. Without denying that a public service company
sells, nor that water, gas and electricity are tangible personal property, the opinion simply concludes that public
service companies distributing these commodities are not
subject to the tax. While the opinion will not be questioned by the public service companies, it may not be as
cordially accepted by those it affects adversely, such as a
company selling coke or coal to a gas company; or a company, not a utility, selling gas to a public service company
which actually does the distributing to the public.
A somewhat similar question has arisen concerning
the taxability of prepared food and beverages sold in restaurants, eating houses, et cetera. A newspaper recently
carried an article citing authorities to the effect that such
27
transactions are not sales under the Uniform Sales Act.
If Uniform Sales Act cases are controlling, and it is believed that they are, then such transactions are doubtless
it is a contract to sell goods. Davis-Watkins Dairymen's Manufacturing Company v. Cronin Dairy, etc., Company, 186 Wisc. 106, 202 N.
W. 293 (1925) (holding that a contract for milk bottles with the name
of the buyer pressed in the glass is a contract to sell goods). Whether
such contracts need be in writing under Section 4 (Statute of Frauds)
of the Uniform Sales Act is another matter.
26This follows from the definition of "'sale" as being "any transfer
*
* for a consideration." Supra, note 1.Section 2.
27Harrisburg Telegraph, September 14, 1932, "City Attorney Says
Restaurant Owners are Safe from Tax."
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taxable, as the recent decisions, the most recent being Penn8
sylvania, hold that such transactions are sales.2
Another typical situation growing out of the troublesome question, who is a consumer, occurs when the buyer
resells the goods purchased as something other than tangible personal property. To illustrate, the purchaser of
building materials may construct a building to sell as real
estate. In such a case, the materials are being resold, but
not as tangible personal property. The Department has
ruled that under these circumstances, the tax applies to the
sale of the building materials as such. It has been argued
by some who question this ruling that it amounts to inserting the words "as tangible personal property" after the
word "resale" in the definition of "vendor" and that, therefore, the ruling is unwarranted. Others have said that
the Department's ruling respecting ingredients conflicts
with this ruling. The Sun Oil case 2 9 seems to furnish a sufficient answer to both objections. The Supreme Court had
no hesitancy in holding that liquid fuels were not being
resold when sold as a part of asphalt, although the words
"as liquid fuels" did appear in that statute after the word
"resale". Furthermore, it necessarily follows from the
reasoning which distinguishes between a tax on resales of
tangible personal property in general, and a tax on resales
of specific commodities, such as liquid fuels, that the former
must apply to sales of tangible personal property which are
resold as something other than tangible personal property.
The principle of the Sun Oil case, in this connection, might
be stated as being that a tax on sales of a given class of
goods, not for resale, applies to all sales of goods of the
class which are resold as anything which does not fall
within the class. This is the basis of the Department's rule
that the Sales Tax applies to all sales of tangible personal
property which are resold as something other than tangible
personal property, such as real estate. The practical question is the same as that found in the Sun Oil case; viz,
2&West v. Katsafans, Pa. Superior Ct., October 10, 1932.

notation 50 A. L. R. 231.
29Commonwealth v. Sun Oil Company, supra note 10,

See an-
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whether such goods should be taxed once or escape the tax
altogether?
Pennsylvania attorneys may with some reason inquire
by what process of logic the Revenue Department arrived
at its ruling that a tax on sales applies to bailment or installment lease sales.
Stress is placed on the numerous decisions recognizing
the difference between bailment or installment lease sales,
on the one hand, and conditional and outright sales, on the
other. The differences between these various transactions
are too well established to admit challenge or require citations. It should be observed here, however, that no Pennsylvania case has come to the attention of the Revenue
Department which can fairly be said to control the question
being discussed. Most bailment lease cases turn on the
rights of tho parties inter se, or on the rights of one against
creditors of or purchasers from the other. Such cases
merely demonstrate that bailment or installment sales
possess different legal attributes than conditional or outright sales.
Further stress is placed on the fact that Section 1 of
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act as enacted by our Legislature, excludes bailment leases from the definition of conditional sale; whereas, the original Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, as drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, expressly includes bailment leases where the agreed compensation is substantially
equivalent to the value of the goods."
s 0The original draft defines conditional sale as follows:
"Section 1. Definition of terms.-In this Act "Conditional sale'"

means (1)any contract for the sale of goods under which possession is
delivered to the buyer and the property in the goods is to vest in the
buyer at a subsequent time upon the payment of part or all of the price,
or upon the performance of any other condition or the happening of
any contingency; or (2) any contract for the bailment or leasing of
goods by which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a
sum substantially equivalent to the value of the goods, and by which it
is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the option
of becoming the owner of such goods upon full compliance with the

terms of the contract."
The Pennsylvania act omits (2) from this definition.
Act of May 12, 1925, P. L.603, Section 1,as amended.
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Finally, it is pointed out that the Commonwealth itself
has, in the past, succcessfully maintained that the installment lease seller has more than a mere paper title. In
Commonwealth v. National Cash Register Company,"' the
Commonwealth claimed that the National Cash Register
Company, a foreign corporation, was liable for capital stock
tax on cash registers delivered to residents under bailment
leases with options to purchase. The capital stock tax requires
reports of foreign corporation "

*

* doing business in and

liable to taxation in this Commonwealth, or having capital
or property employed or used in this Commonwealth,
* *
* "82 and requires all such companies, from which a
report is required, to pay " * * * a tax at the rate of five
mills upon each dollar of the actual value of its whole capital
stock of all kinds * * * ."-" The Supreme Court held that
in computing the taxable value of this company's capital
stock, the cash registers were properly included. At p.
409 the court states:
"Under the terms of the lease, the ownership of
the registers remains in defendant until designated payments are made and the customer exercises his option
to buy. Consequently, the agreement is a bailment and
not a sale of the register. The situs of the property
is in Pennsylvania and represents an investment here
of the capital of a company doing business in this
State.

* * * In the present case, defendant is con-

cededly doing business here and is properly taxable on
such property as it uses within the jurisdiction in the
conduct of its business."
Again, in Commonwealth v. Motors Mortgage Corporaalso a capital stock case, this decision was followed
and its principle applied to a foreign corporation engaged
in the business of financing automobile sales under the
customary plan, whereby the company purchased from the
original dealer-lessor, bailment leases providing for periodic
payments of rental with an option in the lessee to purchase
tion,3 '

81271
82Act
331d.,
3'297

Pa. 406, 114 At. 366, 117 At. 439 (1921).
of June 7. 1879, P. L. 112, Section 20, as amended.
Section 21, as amended.
Pa. 468, 147 At. 98 (1929).
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on further payment of one dollar after all installments of
rental had been paid.
These constitute the chief arguments which must be
met if it can be maintained that the Sales Tax applies to
installment or bailment lease sales.
Practically without exception, objections to this ruling
have come from attorneys, and this seems highly significant. The courts are telling us with increasing emphasis
that taxation is a practical matter. It is easily possible to
become too correct in construing words in a tax statute.
The Supreme Court tells us that '" * * * Laws are written
ordinarily in the language of the people, and not in that of
science ' * * ."" In capital stock tax cases involving the
manufacturing exemption, the Supreme Court has said that
what is manufacturing must be considered "in the popular,
and therefore in the statutory sense of the word."3 6 Again,
in a recent manufacturing case, the Supreme Court reversed
the lower court for having failed to follow "the natural reaction of the mind. ' ' 37 It is a common sense rule that addresses such inquiries to the impartial mind of the average
person. The business man and the accountant have accepted the ruling with no flourish of surprise, but rather as of
course. The flourish of surprise comes after the business
man has consulted an attorney (in some cases, vice versa)
and discovered his technical viewpoint.
Capital stock tax cases are believed to be not in point.
holding legal title of chattels under a bailment
company
A
lease with right to repossess in case of default does, in a
very real sense, continue to have its capital invested in
that property. Invested capital in property with a Pennsylvania tax situs is the criterion for purposes of the capital
stock tax which is a tax on capital stock as property.
Capital stock tax cases, therefore, shed little light on the
question whether the Sales Tax applies to installment lease
sales. It is submitted that the Commonwealth may con85Commonwealth v. Light & Power Company,
seCommonwealth v. Lowry-Rodgers Company,
See Commonwealth v. Glendora Products Company.
37Commonwealth v. Sunbeam Water Company,
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sistently maintain that a corporation lessor or bailor has its
capital invested in property leased or bailed and at the
same time maintain that "sale" in the Sales Tax includes
bailment or installment lease sales.
Nor is the fact conclusive that such transactions were
excluded by the Legislature from the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act. Because the Legislature provides that sales
under the Uniform Sales Act shall have certain legal attributes not possessed by conditional sales; that the latter
shall have certain features and attributes not possessed by
installment or bailment leases; and because our courts recognize and apply these distinctions, by no means does it
follow that all are not to be grouped together under the
common designation of sales, which, in ordinary business
parlance, applies to all alike. The business man understands that the bailment lessor has certain legal rights which
the conditional seller or the one who sells outright on open
credit does not have. In other words, the business man
understands exactly what the Legislature intended. Still,
the bailment lessor considers himself as engaged in the business of selling. To the business man, a bailment lease is
simply an installment sale.
Of all the undercurrents frequently detected between
the lines in tax decisions, perhaps the most prominent is the
element of competition. A tax statute should apply equally
to all engaged in competitive business. While a desire to
accomplish this end, no matter how meritorious, cannot
warrant extending a statute beyond its terms, it does justify
a construction that avoids inequities if the terms fairly support it. The taxing officer would be reluctant to subscribe
to the proposition that A, who sells a chattel for $500.00
on the installment lease plan on February 27, with the
added security of the property to assure payment, owes no
tax; while B, his competitor, who sells the same article on
the same day on open credit, with no added assurance of
payment, must pay the tax on the full selling price, even
though no part of the purchase price is ever actually received.
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These principles are applied by the Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case of Carter v. Slavick Jewelry Company,8
which arose in California under the Federal Revenue Acts
of 1918 and 1921. These acts imposed a tax upon jewelry
"when sold by or for a dealer * * * equivalent to five
per
centum of the price for which so sold." The Slavick Jewelry Company was engaged in selling jewelry under a plan
by which it delivered possession but retained title until the
full purchase price was paid. The tax was assessed and
computed upon the gross contract sales price. In sustaining this assessment the Circuit Court states, at p. 1044 et
seq.:
"It is undoubtedly true, as the jewelry company
contends, that in its primary meaning the term 'sale'
imports a consummated transfer of title from one person to another for a money consideration. But it is
equally true that in private contracts and public laws
it is not infrequently employed to characterize transactions which do not effect an absolute transfer. I1l
lustrative are the following cases: Crall v. Com. 103
Va. 855, 49 S. E. 640, id. 103 Va. 862, 49 S. E. 1038;
South Bend v. Martin, 142 Ind. 31, 29 L. R. A. 531,
41 N. E. 315; Watson v. Brooks, 8 Sawy. 316,
13 Fed. 540; Eaton v. Richeri, 83 Cal. 185, 23 Pac.
286; Shainwald v. Cady, 92 Cal. 83, 28 Pac. 101;
Pettinger v. Fast, 87 Cal. 461, 25 Pac. 680; Smith v.
Mariner, 5 Wis. 551, 581, 68 Am. Dec. 73; Houston, E.
& W. T. R. Co. v. Keller, 90 Tex. 214, 37 S. W. 1063;
Rice v. Mayo, 107 Mass. 550; Humphries v. Smith, 5
Ga. App. 340, 63 S. E. 249; State v. Betz, 207 Mo. 589,
106 S. W. 66.
"Even in treatises on Sales the subject of so-called
conditional sales is sometimes treated. See, for example, Mechem on Sales, Section 558 et seq. Upon
the street and in the commercial world, such is common
usage. Indeed, we have no other single word descriptive of transactions such as are here involved. One
who procures an automobile or a piece of furniture
upon the installment plan, where, as here, the dealer
retains title, is commonly thought and spoken of as a
purchaser, and when the dealer so disposes of merchan8826 F. (2nd) 571, 58 A. L. R. 1043 (1928).
United States, 57 Ct. CI. 259 (1922).

Cf. Anthony v.
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dise it is treated and regarded as a sale, and moneys
received on account thereof as sales receipts. In the
absence of something in the act to suggest that Congress intended the term to be understood in its restricted primary meaning, we must assume it was used
in the broad sense in which it is commonly understood.
Measurably in point is the case of Earle C. Anthony v.

United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 259.

"To conclude, it is our view that Congress intended no distinction between an absolute sale and a
conditional sale, and that in either case the transaction is
assessable when it is entered into. If it be suggested
that under that construction the jewelry company here
would be required to pay a tax upon a part of the sale
price it has not received, the answer is that with equal
force the same plea could be made upon behalf of the
dealer who sells outright upon credit. *

*

*

"Merchants doing a credit business upon the plan
of the jewelry company here could collect the major
part of the sales price, and by charging off the residue
escape the sales tax entirely, and at the same time
utilize the charge-off as a credit against gross income,
and thus escape a ratable portion of that tax also;
whereas, a merchant engaged in the same business, who
extends credit without the protection afforded by conditional sale contracts, is required to pay the sales tax
upon the entire price, whether collected or not.
"We cannot believe that Congress contemplated
such an unreasonable and discriminatory result. * * * "
The Department of Revenue is persuaded that these
same principles apply to installment lease sales in Pennsylvania under the Sales Tax. Of course, the rule is limited
to bailments or leases in which the compensation is substantially equivalent to the value of the goods, and in which
the bailee or lessee is either bound to become or has the
option of becoming the owner upon full compliance with
the terms of the contract. In short, the rule is limited to
such transactions as are ordinarily classified as sales.
Harrisburg, Pa.
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